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ABSTRACT
Public administrations try to address changes in societies with various 
styles through various reforms based on different governance models, 
which are frequently transformed into domestic frames regardless of lo-
cal specifics. The need for a tool with which the ideal types of govern-
ance models could be accommodated with national goals is, in times of 
increasing complexity, more and more relevant. As data as such are pro-
duced through numerous predispositions, the article proposes Ashby’s 
variety to capture the latter, through which it is possible to get closer to 
a successful administration of goals. On the other hand, Douglas’s grid 
and group model, Miles et al.’s organisational strategy, structure and pro-
cess, and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are used for the identification of 
needs. Even though public bodies are aware of the impact that culture/
values has/have on models of public administration, countries base their 
decisions on it/them only indirectly. This article emphasises that certain 
values should be directly included in the governance models in accord-
ance with their cultural backgrounds. The latter are always present in 
decisions’ predispositions (from which decisions obtain their frames and 
weights), and a successful administrator should not disregard them.
Keywords: public governance models, cultural dimensions, public administration, 
reforms, side effects, univergency
JEL: K29
1 Introduction
Models are simplifications of the real world. Even when the same or similar 
styles of governance models, competences, legal rules or other arrangements 
in different legal systems are used, different results would still emerge. This 
can be seen e.g. in the EU member states’ results using the same EU regula-
tions. A gist is hence to know how a specific administrative tradition could be 
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compatible not only with a specific governance model and the global, inter-
national or the EU’s performance imperatives, but also with national (cultur-
al) differences that serve as the formers’ predispositions. Decisions’ adverse 
effects could cause a pessimistic stance, but this could be improved if deci-
sions’ predispositions and/or their common denominators are known. Each 
governance model is also based on legal principles (e.g. Weberian on the rule 
of law, governance on transparency) that are not only the universal element 
of law, but also (in)directly express the basic cultural standpoints of society. 
These conditions predispose individual actions and describe the so-called Zim-
bardo’s Situation: ‘the bigger power for creating evil out of good [is] that of 
the System, the complex of powerful forces that create the Situation. A large 
body of evidence in social psychology supports the concept that situation-
al power triumphs over individual power in given contexts’ (Zimbardo, 2008, 
p. x). The core of culture ‘is formed by values as broad tendencies to prefer 
certain states of affairs over others. They deal with pairings such as…follow-
ing: evil versus good, dirty versus clean’ (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 9) etc. Val-
ues can serve as “normative patterns” through which norms are legitimised 
(Parsons, 1985). Works in this domain are focused on the relation between 
the values and electoral institutions (Katz, 1997), the values and economic 
(Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998), on values that produce institutions and social 
norms (Argandona, 1991), on democratic values and institutions (Besley and 
Persson, 2019), values and accountability (Pečarič, 2018b) and legal principles 
as extrapolated reality (Pečarič, 2018a). Based on the mentioned connection 
between the governance models and legal principles, a research question is:
RQ1: If countries want to minimise the side effects of their decisions/mod-
els, should they consider their dependencies based on their (cultural) 
predispositions?
As the science of public administration (PA) is built on general factors (the 
same as legal principles) that transcend national borders, this paper claims 
different practices or path dependencies of PAs can be reconciled with a new 
approach, here-called “univergent”. This approach acknowledges universal 
platforms and differences at the same time (like the EU’s motto “united in di-
versity” or the concept of universal service in regulated industries). The univer-
gent approach is based on “universal diversity”, i.e. the approach that recog-
nises the known general elements of PA (e.g. centralisation, decentralisation, 
hierarchy, subsidiarity; in the legal side of PA it is present in the legal principles 
of administrative law), but also perceive differences that emerge by applying 
these general elements through (national/local) values. In the last decade of 
the 20th century OECD claimed (in the instrumental manner) that basic PA 
values are shared between the EU member states and the EU candidate coun-
tries with the notion of “the European Administrative Space” (1999), while to 
the European Commission (in the semi non-instrumentalist manner) ‘distin-
guishing principles as durable values is less important than ensuring the set 
of values governing public behaviour is clear and widely shared’ (2015, p. 17). 
The promotion of values by their enumeration and descriptions as the princi-
ples of good governance is not enough, because values emerge only within 
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specific contexts, and in connection with specific actions. The latter in time 
transform external motions into intrinsic desirability as they become embed-
ded in culture. Values from one country do not automatically work under dif-
ferent circumstances in another, and the same − based on different countries’ 
scorings on various indexes − stands for the well-known Weberian or other 
governance models. European Commission admits ‘there is very little rigor-
ous research how values become integrated and ingrained in the culture of 
public administrations’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 23). At first it should 
be known how values evolve, (re)act and change their content in different 
surroundings and how they can be implemented in different countries. How 
values or models capture the environmental dynamism, how they react in a 
predicted manner? The implementation of formally equal values/principles in 
a different environment produces different results from the “ideal type” gov-
ernance models. This gap can be partially filled with institutional actions that 
change social practices, provided that a model’s value is known. Based on the 
above-mentioned ideas (of univergency, predispositions, values, actions and 
principles) related with the Ashby’s requisite variety (1957), Douglas’s grid 
and group cultural model (2012), Miles et al.’s (2003) adaptation cycle model, 
and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (2010) the hypothesis is:
H1: The institutional environment depends on the fit between strategies, 
tools and implementation processes, when they derive their meanings 
and understandings from the cultural-value background.
H1 will be tested to answer on RQ1. The global competitiveness and human 
development indexes of countries will be used for this; both indexes are put 
into a four-quadrant cultural model. H1 is based on the predisposition that 
countries, which embrace a model that incorporates values as decisions’ pre-
dispositions, can achieve a better fit between strategies and processes. To 
support this, a method will be presented that can help us understand how 
ideas are gradually transformed into values. By using the country-specific find-
ings each country could better choose which decisions and means could be 
the most appropriate for its cultural context. The proposed method can also 
explain how national (cultural) differences – that should be considered – can 
be considered/changed to be better aligned with the dynamic environment. 
By these steps, countries can be armed with new perspectives and possibili-
ties to reach the same goals by more effective paths. Decisions in PA depend 
on time, place, resources, their implementations and other factors, while val-
ues as decisions’ predispositions depend on practices as path dependencies. 
The latter also causes for discrepancy between our inner values and the outer 
formal law. These differences will be shown in the second section, and will in 
turn be used in the third to address variety to be able to address the cultural 
conceptions of values in public reforms in the fourth section. In the fifth, dif-
ferences between conceptions and countries will be used to show a platform 
(made by four basic dimensions of human character or culture) that will serve 
as a standpoint from which PAs’ reforms can be explained de novo. The same 
platform as a model of universal value spectrum that embraces differences as 
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its conditio sine qua non will also show implications for the PA’s model in the 
sixth section, after which conclusion follows.
2 Every model of governance has its specifics
The example of New Public Management (NPM) is used here to show a dis-
crepancy between the inner values and outer formal law. In the present time, 
when NPM’s euphoria has subsided and increasingly resembles to other the-
ories of PA that wanted to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of PA. 
In Waldo’s style decision-makers can ask “Efficiency for what” (1948)? If they 
want relevant answers, they should ask who, what, when, how and with what 
something should be done. Answers would probably be to some point differ-
ent for each PA. For Ongaro ‘the basic note [of public reforms] seems to be 
one of continuity: the public administration of the five countries under exam-
ination [Portugal, Greece, Spain, France and Italy] still displays many of the 
basic characteristics that could be found 30 or 40, or many more, years ago’ 
(2010, p. 263). According to Pollit and Bouckaert (2011) from the late 1990s 
to 2010 there is ‘[n]o dominant model [of public management, but rather] 
several key concepts, including governance, networks, partnerships, “joining 
up”, transparency, and trust’ (2011, p. 11). There are many specifics in every 
country, and any kind of “good” ideas should be handled with care: ‘far from 
being new-minded in the 1980s, most of the basic ideas about how to manage 
in government have a history…[so] we need to be wary of taken-for-granted 
assumptions about who is to count as a manager of public services, what man-
agement means, what “best practice” amounts to and who or what to blame 
when things go wrong’ (Hood, 1998, p. 22). There is neither time nor space to 
further enumerate all authors that have elaborated the positive and negative 
effects of the PA reforms (Crozier, 1964; Merton, 1968; Simon, 1997), but 
they would probably agree that each administration has a positive potential 
vis-à-vis positive effects, which can become also negative.
Decision-makers should be aware on different contexts in which decisions/
models are taken/used; solutions depend on numerous elements that include 
also the unknown, uncertain or probable, which might undermine desired re-
sults. Many times, partial successes are present with side effects produced. 
The principle of care cannot per se provide appropriate grounds for making 
decisions without taking differences into account. Despite numerous claims 
about inter- and multi-disciplinarity PAs need a wider perspective from which 
evaluation, balance or better explanation of intended actions can be under-
stood. PAs have along the different characteristics and specifics also differ-
ences present in the apparently equal elements: what can be good some-
where can be bad in other place (one man’s poison is another man’s cure1). 
Nature is more complex than people; there is always more variety in the world 
than can ever be built into any kind of governance model. Yet we ought to 
be aware of what we can still do – unintended consequences or side effects 
1 Variety or relativity is known for a long time: the Roman poet Lucretius coined the expression 
in the first century BC, “quod ali cibus est aliis fuat acre venenum” (what is food for one man may 
be bitter poison to other).
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emerge due to non-understanding of variety, and to build a more relevant 
model of PA or to make an effective decision the understanding and adminis-
tration of variety is required.
3 Variety
Ashby proposed variety as the measure for complexity in the 1950s. For him 
‘[a]n essential feature of the good regulator is that it blocks the flow of vari-
ety from disturbances to essential variables’ (Ashby, 1957, p. 201). If variety 
in outcomes is to be reduced to some assigned number, than a regulator’s 
variety of tools vis-à-vis environment ‘must be increased…to at least the ap-
propriate minimum’ (Ashby, 1957, p. 206). Only Variety can force down Va-
riety and vice versa: only variety can destroy variety. Ashby’s variety balances 
the system from a control standpoint between the regulator and the outer 
environment. A homeostatic loop of the regulator’s amplifiers (from the reg-
ulator to the system) and filters (from the system to the regulator) is inserted 
to deal only with an interested part of the environment, because the latter 
is too complex to deal with it as a whole. Complex adaptive systems are the 
‘systems that involve many components that adapt or learn as they interact’ 
(Holland, 2006, p. 1) have a characteristic element known as emergence: ‘[a]n 
emergent property is a global behaviour or structure which appears through 
interactions of a collection of elements, with no global controller responsi-
ble for the behaviour or organisation of these elements. The idea of emer-
gence is not reducible to the properties of the elements’ (Feltz et al., 2006, 
p. 241). With its regulatory and learning element it is no wonder why variety 
and complexity has attracted attention also of scholars, who tried to trans-
fer complex systems theory to organisations and PA. Efforts include works 
of Senge (2010), Stacey (1992), Wheatley (Wheatley, 2006), Goldstein (1994), 
and others (Bovaird, 2008; Haynes, 2008; Klijn, 2008; Teisman and Klijn, 2008), 
but Rhodes and her colleagues (Eppel and Rhodes, 2018a, 2018b; Koliba et 
al., 2016; Rhodes, 2008; Rhodes et al., 2010; Rhodes and MacKechnie, 2003; 
Rhodes and Murray, 2007) conclude ‘there has been little attention paid to 
how this research [on complexity theory] has translated into practice or into 
the teaching of public administration’ (Eppel and Rhodes, 2018a, p. 1).
Complexity represents things with many parts that interact with each other 
in multiple relations, while variety is the measure for defining the number 
of those possible relations. Performance criteria – that are so emphasised 
in quality management – can be set only after we have identified goals and 
available tools as the amplifiers and filters (the non-identification of these 
tools could be fatal for many PAs). The larger the variety of actions controllers 
can have, the larger the variety of perturbations that must be compensated. 
There should be as many elements on the one side as there are on the oth-
er side, if one wants to establish variety in their relations (requisite variety).2 
Requisite variety is a tool that can give decision-makers the appropriate mo-
2 If it is almost self-evident that two sports teams should have a same number of players, this 
self-evidency is somehow lost in more important things...
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dus operandi with which they can are closer to their goals; in order to deal 
effectively with diverse problems, there must be multiple responses that 
should be as nuanced as the problems at hand. This approach is sine qua non 
for managing variety, but it cannot give us an answer to why one alternative 
was chosen instead of another. Which decisions are chosen and implemented 
can depend on causes hidden in our cultural values as predispositions. As will 
be demonstrated in the next chapters, values are not only present in our de-
cisions, but form a very influential part, although we are mostly unaware of 
this – pre-decisional – point.
4 Cultural conceptions of values in public reforms
For Durkheim as the author of the concept of (mechanical and organic) soli-
darity, social solidarity is a moral phenomenon, which is not amenable to ex-
act observation and measurement, so ‘we must substitute this internal datum 
with a visible one, with the law’ (1984, p. 24). Despite of differences between 
solidarity and law, they can be put into the same frame within one culture 
as their denominator. And Mary Douglas did precisely this: ‘[a]rguing from 
different premises, we can never improve our understanding unless we ex-
amine and reformulate our assumptions’ (1986, p. 8), so any kind of decision 
can exist only when individuals have the common categories of thought. Both 
Durkheim and Douglas point to public institutions that primarily formulate as-
sumptions for the public, and these assumptions are built into decisions. As 
public institutions are authority figures their decisions will be respected up to 
a certain point, but their decisions could be more effective, if they targeted 
our common assumptions. ‘Ideas and values only become strongly entrenched 
when they are embedded in institutions’ (Douglas, 2012), while the latter are 
embedded in a nation’s culture. To cultural theory a boundary line between 
the legal and the non-legal is not self-evident, because it is socially construct-
ed; classification is thus a creation of culture: ‘[t]he culturally learned intu-
itions guide our judgment for any of our fields of competence, [and] teach us 
enough probabilistic principles, but they are heavily culture bound’ (Douglas, 
1994, p. 57). Cultural theory can help us describe the complexity of moderni-
sation because it shares a common denominator. The inherited ideas, beliefs, 
and values bind society together, and are also present in the public law; the 
latter more or less binds us to one another through the public interest and 
solidarity. The public opinion analysis or opinion should not be used only for 
the enhanced consultation and dialogue with citizens in search for higher le-
gitimacy, but to gain insight into the people’s motivations, feelings and reac-
tions with regard to a particular topic. We will try to show how culture reflects 
our decisions and/or also the (un) successfulness of public reforms.
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4.1 The grid and group cultural model
One of the well-known typologies for the distribution of values within a pop-
ulation is Douglas’s grid and group analysis (Douglas, 1982, 2003, 2012);3 it 
shows connections between the different kinds of social organisation and val-
ues that uphold them. Her model of the distribution of values gives – under 
the grid and group as the basic dimensions of sociality – a fourfold typology 
of solidarities or four ideal types of cultural bias: individualism, hierarchy, fa-
talism and egalitarianism:
Diagram 1: Some synonyms for the four quadrants of grid and group
Group                                             +  
G
rid
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 +
  
A                                               
 
INDIVIDUALIST 
≈ 
Competitive individualism 
Active individualism 
Market 
D                                         
ENCLAVIST 
≈ 
Dissident enclave 
Egalitarian enclave 
Sect 
Factionalism 
Egalitarian collectivism 
B                                               
 
ISOLATE 
≈ 
Atomized subordination 
Insulated 
Backwater isolation 
C                                           
HIERARCHIST 
≈ 
Strong group 
Bureaucracy 
Central community 
Ascribed hierarchy 
Conservative hierarchy 
Collectivism with structure 
Source: Fardon, 1999, p. 224.
Douglas’s GGCT model was applied by Hood in the field of public manage-
ment: ‘a cultural-theory approach has much to offer to the art of the state 
as a framing approach for thinking creatively about available forms of or-
ganization and in exploring the variety of what-to-do ideas that will always 
surround public services and government’ (1998, p. 241). To him ‘[t]here is 
no universal agreement on what counts as “problem” and what as “solution”, 
or when the point is reached where the “solution” becomes worse than the 
“problem”’ (1998, pp. 24–25). For the individualist good administration hap-
pens within the market and is driven by competition, for the hierarchist it is 
present in expertise and authority within government, for the egalitarian it 
can be achieved by consensus, while the fatalist (in isolation) does not even 
3 The group dimension taps the extent to which ‘the individual’s life is absorbed in and sus-
tained by group membership’, while the grid dimension is characterised by ‘an explicit set of 
institutionalised classifications that keeps individuals apart and regulates their interactions’ 
(Douglas, 1982, pp. 202–203).
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care for it and does not think about many unpredictable/side effects of plan-
ning, so s/he just goes with the flow. For Douglas, all cultures can be assessed 
and classified according to these ways of life, which constitute an exhaustive 
list of viable cultural possibilities. This however cannot yet provide sufficient 
grounds for understanding them; countries should know what values prevail 
within their borders to effectively apply reforms, and a warning should be 
made before transferring legal institutes from other countries that do not 
have the same values. Regulation places constraints on a specific nation’s 
cultural platform, by providing (dis)incentives for human behaviour, markets 
and companies (Ashby’s requisite variety is hence a method of operation to 
amplify or to filter, not a goal per se). We have to select the most appropriate 
regulative and economic tools (as amplifiers and filters) from those that are 
legally and materially available. Regulatory approaches require changes in be-
haviour by introducing negative/positive effects for those who do or do not 
comply with regulatory provisions. Only then can requisite variety achieve its 
goal. Douglas’s GGCT model can be used for a better interpretation of a par-
ticular regulatory tool and its placement into a specific field within the square 
according to people’s preferences. An analysis of people’s preferences would 
give better opportunities to choose the most appropriate policies and their 
corresponding tools. An online voting platform for people to voice their opin-
ions and choices by filling in questionnaires or surveys on political views or 
similar issues important to them could provide a better means of selecting 
the most appropriate regulatory tool. This could be implemented by IT and – 
as a matter of fact – it has been already done. We refer to Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions that will be presented in the subchapter 4.3.
4.2 Strategy, structure and process
Before we turn to Hofstede’s dimensions we must mention another model 
that is similar to Douglas’s GGCT model, namely the adaptive cycle model of 
Miles et al. (1978). Within this model there are three “problems” of organisa-
tional adaptation: the entrepreneurial problem (goal – strategy), the engineer-
ing problem (system – technology) and the administrative problem (structure 
– process). Performance depends on the adoption of strategies, systems and 
processes that are aligned with an organisation’s environment. Organisations 
must employ strategies for solving problems according to essentially three 
strategic types of organisation: Defenders, Analysers and Prospectors,4 while 
4 1. Defenders are organizations which have narrow product-market domains. Top managers 
in this type of organization are highly expert in their organization’s limited area of operation 
but do not tend to search outside their domain for new opportunities. These organizations 
seldom need to make major adjustments in their technology, structure, or methods of oper-
ation. Instead, they devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of their existing op-
erations. 2. Prospectors are organizations which almost continually search for market oppor-
tunities, and they regularly experiment with potential responses to emerging environmental 
trends. However, because of their strong concern for product and market innovation, these 
organizations are usually not completely efficient. 3. Analysers are organizations which oper-
ate in two types of product-market domains, one relatively stable, the other changing. In their 
stable areas, these organizations operate routinely and efficiently through use of formalized 
structures and processes. In their more turbulent areas, top managers watch their compet-
itors closely for new ideas, and then they rapidly adopt those which appear to be the most 
promising. 4. Reactors are organizations in which top managers frequently perceive change 
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the fourth, Reactor, is residual and occurs when a business lacks insight, or if 
it fails to take advantage of alignment opportunities afforded by the adaptive 
cycle. Andrews et al. (2012), based on the work of Miles and Snow (2003), fo-
cused on the impact of strategic management on the effectiveness of public 
services. They confirmed their hypotheses on structure and strategy content:
high performance appears to be more likely for public organizations that 
match their decision-making structure with their strategic stance. Defending 
organizations with a high degree of hierarchical authority and low staff in-
volvement in decision-making, in particular, perform better, but prospecting 
organizations with high decision participation are also likely to do well. By 
contrast, hierarchy of authority and participation in decision-making make 
no difference to the performance of reacting organizations (Andrews et al., 
2012, pp. 124–125).
They have statistically confirmed that the degree of both hierarchy of author-
ity and participation in decision-making are unrelated to how well services 
perform, but on the other hand, strategies work better if they are aligned 
with the organisational structure: rational planning with hierarchy and cen-
tralisation (while centralisation is unrelated to performance with an absence 
of strategy), and logical incrementalism with decentralised responsibility. ‘Re-
actors perform better only when they are subject to regulation that comple-
ments their existing strategic orientation’ (2012, p. 145). ‘Prospecting will im-
prove performance if carried out in combination with a high level of decision 
participation…[while] organizations that adopt a defending strategy enhance 
their performance if they centralize authority and reduce decision participa-
tion’ (2012, p. 122). Public managers should not seek the best strategy but 
ought to identify and accommodate the many contingencies that shape the 
success of different strategies: ‘what counts is the combination of strategy 
with other influences on organizational outcomes’ (2012, p. 150). If we want 
the right fit between the desired goals we should be aware of ways that form 
them. Miles and Snow are one step ahead of Douglas because they emphasise 
the right fit between strategy, system and process, and not just the strate-
gic typologies. The latter can be aligned with Douglas’s GGCT model in the 
and uncertainty occurring in their organizational environments but are unable to respond ef-
fectively. Because this type of organization lacks a consistent strategy-structure relationship, 
it seldom makes adjustment of any sort until forced to do so by environmental pressures (R. 
Miles & Snow, 2003, p. 29)endlessly. But a few do stick, and this book is such a one. Organiza-
tional Strategy, Structure, and Process broke fresh ground in the understanding of strategy 
at a time when thinking about strategy was still in its early days, and it has not been displaced 
since.\”—David J. Hickson, Emeritus Professor of International Management & Organization, 
University of Bradford School of ManagementOriginally published in 1978, Organizational 
Strategy, Structure, and Process became an instant classic, as it bridged the formerly separate 
fields of strategic management and organizational behavior. In this Stanford Business Classics 
reissue, noted strategy scholar Donald Hambrick provides a new introduction that describes 
the book’s contribution to the field of organization studies. Miles and Snow also contribute 
new introductory material to update the book’s central concepts and themes.Organizational 
Strategy, Structure, and Process focuses on how organizations adapt to their environments. 
The book introduced a theoretical framework composed of a dynamic adaptive cycle and an 
empirically based strategy typology showing four different types of adaptation. This frame-
work helped to define subsequent research by other scholars on important topics such as 
configurational analysis, organizational fit, strategic human resource management, and multi-
firm network organizations.”
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following way: Hierarchist – Defender; Individualist – Prospector; Enclavist – 
Analyser; Isolate – Reactor. This typology and Douglas’s GGCT model will be 
now used in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.
4.3 Dimensions
Geert Hofstede has examined variations in values and organisational norms 
over three decades across fifty countries. A cultural perspective has quite a 
lot to do with public management reform because ‘Hofstede’s measures…
reflect the broad cultural climates in which management reforms will have to 
be announced, interpreted, promoted, and resisted in each particular coun-
try’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p. 64). In the style of cultural relativism, Hof-
stede et al. claim that ‘[w]e cannot change the way people in a country think, 
feel, and act by simply importing foreign institutions…Each country has to 
struggle through its own type of reforms, adapted to the software of its peo-
ple’s minds’ (2010, p. 25). According to them there are six dimensions of cul-
ture that can be measured in relation to other cultures, but here we shall use 
only the 1st, 2nd and 4th dimension (because the 3rd, 5th, and 6th one [Femininity 
versus Masculinity, Long-term versus Short-term Orientation and Indulgence 
versus Restraint] cannot be connected with Douglas’s GGCT model and Miles 
and Snow’s strategic typologies – these will all later be put in the model of 
ranking values in cultural dimensions):
Power Distance is defined as “the extent to which the less powerful members 
of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that pow-
er is distributed unequally” (ibid, p. 61). Collectivism versus Individualism: “indi-
vidualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: 
everyone is expected to look after him or herself and his or her immediate 
family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from 
birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout 
people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loy-
alty” (ibid, p. 92). Uncertainty Avoidance: “the extent to which the members of 
a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations” (2010, p. 191).
If these dimensions and their specifics are applied to states’ actions, differenc-
es between states can be seen or easily understood. The following sections of 
this paper attempt to do this: Hofstede’s cultural dimensions can be at first 
compared with Douglas’s GGC model (the latter is similar to Hofstede’s collec-
tivism versus power distance - first two dimensions). It is possible to compare 
them because they contain similar elements: power distance corresponds to 
grid, while individualism versus collectivism corresponds to group. Many coun-
tries that score high on the power distance index (PDI; the horizontal axis) 
score low on the individualism index (IDV; the vertical axis), and vice versa. 
They are either hierarchical or individualistic. Countries with low PDI and IDV 
are enclavist, and those with high PDI and IDV are isolative. While the first two 
fit very well into Hofstede’s classification, the enclavist and isolative do not. It 
should be stressed that Douglas’s model is an ideal type. It is a useful meth-
odological device to begin the comparison of biases within related cultures 
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with; however, a social reality is more complex. Her description of the isolate 
and egalitarian positions can hold if we are within5 a nation’s culture, but if 
we compare cultures, then these positions exchange places: isolate becomes 
egalitarian and vice versa. Countries with a high grid value and a low group val-
ue are more consensus-oriented, egalitarian, there rankings and ordering are 
the usual ways of controlling the social impact, and they have (modest) citizen 
participation, problems of leadership, authority and decision making, whereas 
countries with a low grid value and a high group value (from their point of 
view) might be more influenced by randomness, isolation and dependence on 
other countries. This is more clearly presented in the following section.
5 Between conceptions and countries
The legal and administrative framework within which individuals, companies, 
and governments interact to achieve their goals determines an institutional 
environment, which is co-determined also by socio(cultural)-economic con-
text. While the latter is mainly influenced by technology, place and time, the 
institutional environment depends on the fit between strategies, tools and 
procedures of implementation processes. We shall verify this by analysing the 
global competitiveness (because we are interested in PAs, we shall look at 
the elements of the quality of institutions and the quality of life) and human 
development indexes. Both indexes for specific countries are put into Hofst-
ede’s PDI v. IDV model (Figure 1). The numbers added into his model are the 
rankings of quality of institutions from The Global Competitiveness Report 
2012-2013 (Schwab, 2012), and the numbers in the brackets are the Human 
Development Index 2011 rankings (2011):
5 The extreme top on the left side has strong grid controls, without any group membership 
to sustain individuals. Anyone who arrives here is a cultural isolate…as far as public policy is 
concerned. Isolates attract no attention; no one asks for their opinion or takes them seriously 
in argument. Hence their reputation of apathy (Douglas, 2012).
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Figure 1: Power Distance versus Individualism6
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As can be seen in the Figure 1 the highest-ranking institutions and the high-
est quality of life can be found in the Prospector (Individualist) countries 
(e.g. Norway, New Zealand, the Netherlands), but also in the Defender (Hi-
erarchist) countries (e.g. Singapore, Japan). While this confirms the analysis 
of Andrews et al. that neither centralised nor decentralised decision-making 
has an independent effect on the public service performance, the average 
number of countries in each quadrant confirms even more Miles and Snow’s 
(2003) argument that an organisation’s overall strategy must fit to its environ-
ment, organisation structures and management processes, whereas the en-
tire organisation must continually adapt in order to maintain its fit over time. 
The top countries can be found in the lower quadrants and in the right up-
per quadrant, but the average numbers show that 1) the area of Prospector 
(∑ 24,7 [21,9]) is the most favourable place for institutions and in terms of the 
quality of life; 2) the area of Analyser (∑ 48,75 [26,12]) is in the middle of those 
countries where the quality of institutions drops faster than the quality of 
6 The basic scheme is taken from Hofstede et al. (2010, p. 103). The following has been added 
to the original scheme: the quality of institutions and human development indices, a grey area 
indicating the dominant positions of countries between the PDI and IDV, and descriptions 
next to individual quadrants pointing out the prevailing ideas according to Douglas’s GGCT 
model and Miles and Snow’s model of adaptive cycle.
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life; and 3) in the area of Defender (∑ 74,66 [73,12]) the quality of institutions 
is lower than that of Analyser and higher than that of Reactor (∑ 92,25 [64]), 
but the quality of life is the lowest. The distribution of countries in quadrants 
presented by the given averages (∑) shows that it is erroneous for govern-
ments to use the same approach and tools for different goals or even for the 
same goals in different times or places. The Defender (Hierarchist) countries 
can be as good as the Analyser (Enclavist) or Prospector (Individualist) ones, 
while all must take care of the right fit between goals, tools and processes. In 
large power distance countries, hierarchy causes a considerable dependence 
of subordinates on the rulers and rules or vice versa, on rational planning, cen-
tralisation and information channels. Defender should use Defender’s tools 
and processes, Analyser and Prospector their own, while Reactor usually uses 
those of Defender. Collectivist countries should be careful when using indi-
vidualistic methods for economic incentives, while individualistic countries 
could use collective methods mainly for the rule of law and the basic social 
welfare.
Figure 1 can also highlight a set of ideal types for managing performance. 
People always want to decrease uncertainty (a source of anxiety). As the laws 
and rules are among other methods (religion, culture, technology) most “con-
venient” for diminishing uncertainty, uncertainty avoidance can be presented 
to show differences between countries (Figure 2), foremost because of its 
similarity with the law, i.e. with legal certainty and legal expectations:
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Figure 2: Power Distance versus Uncertainty Avoidance7
In the Figure 2, Singapore and New Zealand are the starting points, being the 
countries of the first and of the second rank in terms of the quality of in-
stitutions. The arrows point from these two countries to the countries that 
are in their neighbourhoods, while here are placed more apart due to the un-
7 The basic scheme is taken from Hofstede et al. (2010, p. 303). The arrows added to the original 
figure show how some countries that are close to each other in the PDI – IDV model are here 
separated.
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 18, No. 1/2020 83
Understanding Differences between Equal Public Governance Models
certainty avoidance dimension. The countries that are within the quadrant of 
individualistic countries (with a low PDI and a high IDV) in the PDI – IDV model 
retained a more similar position than the countries with a high PDI and a low 
IDV. Due to the added uncertainty avoidance dimension, the countries with 
a high PDI and a high IDV are now more similar to some countries with a low 
IDV (Portugal, Slovenia, Serbia, S Korea and Chile8 with France and Belgium). 
Although the last two states place high value on individualism, it seems that 
it is not as powerful as in the countries with the same degree of individualism 
but with a smaller PDI (otherwise the uncertainty avoidance value would be 
similar as for the first cited countries). According to the global competitive-
ness index, the inefficient government bureaucracy is among the most prob-
lematic factors for doing business (Schwab, 2012). The Power Distance versus 
Individualism and Power Distance versus Uncertainty Avoidance figures can 
give some explanation why the NPM’s “euphoria” cannot bring good results 
for the NPM in the areas of Reactor, Defender or Analyser (from worse to 
less bad): countries in these areas have other backgrounds, and use differ-
ent models for institutions and rules. Some of the NPM’s ideas (e.g. “let the 
middle managers manage” and/or “slim down central civil service”) are not as 
easily achieved in the countries with a high PDI and a high(er) IDV as they can 
be in those with a low PDI and a low(er) IDV.
6 Implications for the models of public administration
What can be recommended for PAs according to the applied method? Well, 
countries in the Prospector area (Individualist), with a high IDV and a low PDI 
(see the lower left quadrant in Figure 1), are on average the best for maintain-
ing competitiveness and the quality of life – but only on average. Top coun-
tries in terms of these criteria are also found in the Analyser (Enclavist) and 
Defender (Hierarchist) areas, although they represent a minority among the 
countries of the same type. Creating a strategy with appropriate tools and 
processes is vital for the overall success. Introducing the NPM in hierarchi-
cal countries might cause side effects of the larger bureaucracy, more public 
servants, wastefulness, re-regulation, higher corruption9 etc., because such 
countries are not accustomed to the decentralised methods of organisation 
and individualistic mentality; contrary, individualistic countries − to which the 
model of NPM is the most appropriate − should be cautious about introduc-
ing hierarchical elements because these diminish democracy and freedom, as 
well as enhance control and obedience. Those are all elements of centralised, 
Weberian organisations, which from the collectivist point of view are essen-
tial for good administration. People living in hierarchical countries do not view 
8 These countries – if they want to reduce uncertainty – should model themselves more after 
the main features of public administration Singapore-style and transfer them according to 
their contexts. For the main features of the public administration in Singapore see (Quah, 
2010). The above-mentioned countries should also reduce collectivist elements, which would 
bring them closer to France or Belgium.
9 From 2001 to 2011 the Corruption Perception Index mostly got worse for hierarchical coun-
tries: Slovenia (34–37), Croatia (47–62), Russia (79–133), Romania (69–66), Hong Kong (14–
14), Brazil (46–69), Turkey (54–54), Greece (42–94), Thailand (61–88), Taiwan (27–37), Malaysia 
(36–54). Available at: http://www.transparency.org (accessed 20 December 2018).
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their freedom as the people in the individualistic ones; they have a different 
perspective, so it is not useful to talk about less freedom from the individual-
istic point of view in hierarchical countries, just as it is useless to talk about the 
“selfish” individualistic mentality from the hierarchical point of view.
Exporting ideas or models of governance to other countries without regard 
to their respective contexts and values into which new ideas are transferred 
can have a limited success (although the transfer is well-intentioned); failures 
are then described as inefficiency, illegality, corruption etc. Every country has 
its own causes for a prevalence of specific values (they have proved success-
ful during a country’s history; they have stored information that is constantly 
transmitted into values). Values can be changed only gradually, and by small 
steps. Culture is influenced by our experiences not by our genes. A human 
power to move and change physical things is, or can be, used for the efficient 
control over our psychological elements, which we can influence indirectly 
through our activity:
Because we always have control over our component of behaviour, there 
are also simultaneously – if we significantly change our behaviour – changed 
components of thinking and feeling and our physiology. The more we actively 
engage in the active behaviour…the more we will also revise our thoughts, 
feelings, and listen to what our body tells us. If this gives us greater control, 
there will also be better feelings, more pleasant thoughts, and physical com-
fort (Glasser, 1994, p. 51).
Activities that cause failure or success are usually formed in a sequence; each 
level represents its distinct tendency, but together they form an interactive 
whole in which higher levels provide the context for the lower ones. The same 
stands for institutions and their models of governance. We should thus be at-
tentive to new circumstances, to the “new rules of the game”. The cumulative 
effects of these stages ultimately manifest themselves in a shift of paradigm, 
from “it has always been done this way” to “we are going to challenge our 
assumptions as often as we can”. Unpredictability can be undermined by pre-
diction and preparation. Multi-minded purposeful organisations are the basic 
requirement for all countries (i.e. with a high or a low PDI or IDV) to enable 
the amplifiers and filters (managing variety) to be formed at the right time 
and place. There is a constant need for better information in public admin-
istration, but apart from information a commitment to evaluate it – and to 
change our practices if this is necessary for better results – is also welcome. 
An answer to what is needed, urgent or what is better can be found only in 
the relative (higher or lower) importance of our goals that emanate from our 
values.
7 Conclusion
The science of PA can build its elements on predispositions that are differ-
ent from the present ones. A country’s cultural and socio-economic context 
can give more relevant predispositions (cultural dimensions) upon which deci-
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sions and tools for their implementation should be made and/or operate in a 
certain country. Decision-makers should be aware of different cultural, social, 
economic and other countries’ backgrounds, because they cause differences 
among countries. These differences as values should fit to strategies, tools 
and implementation processes: the better fit means the higher rank. H1 is thus 
confirmed and with this also the answer on RQ1: countries should consider re-
lations between decisions and their cultural backgrounds. Good governance 
can be established in a frame of different values without affecting the idea 
of good governance itself. It is backgrounds that decide what will work and 
what will not − not in an absolute sense, but they can undermine otherwise 
well-intentioned plans. Cultural predispositions as the real purpose in action 
can be slowly changed by longevity, determination and modelling behaviour 
if appropriate strategies, tools and processes are used. The institutional en-
vironment depends on the fit between strategies, tools and implementation 
processes, while they all derive their meanings and understandings from the 
cultural-value background. Countries should consider dependencies between 
decisions and their (cultural) predispositions; the ranking of values in cultural 
dimensions can give us a better platform with which decisions can be custom-
ized to a country’s specifics, while each country is on its own decisional path 
and actions. A general, nomothetic recipe cannot bring the same results in dif-
ferent countries. This paper emphasised the countries’ inevitable differences 
and specifics that form their specific varieties. The latter can be tamed only 
with opposite varieties within the mix of organisational strategy, structure 
and process that corresponds to specific cultural dimensions. Reforms can be 
successful, not only if they include cultural dimensions, but primarily if they 
serve as the starting point of reforms. From these standpoints the value of 
governance models can be established for a specific country.
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